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Complaint Should Not Have Been Dismissed Solely Upon the Determination an Arbitration Clause Was Valid and Applicable

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed an action bases solely on the fact the contract between the parties had an arbitration clause.  Dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) lies only if there has been arbitration and award:

In its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, the defendant … contended that an arbitration clause contained in its contract with the plaintiff was valid and applicable, and, therefore, required dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against it. However, “[i]n the absence of arbitration and an award, CPLR 3211 furnishes no basis for a dismissal because of the presence in the contract of an arbitration provision” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of the defendant New Clients, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it based solely upon its determination that the arbitration clause was valid and applicable. Hui v New Clients, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 01924, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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