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Under the Criteria Recently Announced by the Court of Appeals, the Proof Was Not Sufficient to Justify Placing the Respondent Under Strict and Intensive Supervision in the Community

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, applied the criteria recently announced by the Court of Appeals and determined the state had not presented sufficient proof to justify placing the respondent, a sex offender who had served 33 years in prison, under strict and intensive supervision (SIST) in the community.  The opinion is very detailed and defies summary.  Some of the main points follow:

The State of New York brought this Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) article 10 proceeding seeking civil commitment of respondent as a dangerous sex offender. This proceeding, however, preceded the recent pronouncement by the Court of Appeals in Matter of State of New York v Donald DD. (24 NY3d 174 [2014]). In Donald DD., the Court of Appeals limited the evidence that can be used to civilly commit a convicted sex offender, and clarified that a sex offender cannot be subject to civil commitment solely because the individual is diagnosed as suffering from an abnormality that predisposes him to commit sexual offenses. In so doing, the Court of Appeals clarifies the line between civil commitment and penal commitment. In this case, we heed this clarification by dismissing this MHL article 10 proceeding on the ground that the State has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent has or will have serious difficulty controlling his behavior. * * *

…[T]he jury found that respondent suffers from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under MHL article 10. Following a dispositional hearing where the State experts and respondent testified, Supreme Court found that respondent is not a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement, and ordered instead that he submit to strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) in the community. * * *

…[T]he statute requires that all offenders subject to civil management, including SIST, must be found to have a mental abnormality as a threshold qualification. MHL § 10.03(i) defines a mental abnormality as “a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct.”

Article 10 authorizes civil confinement only of those sex offenders whose “mental abnormality” involves such a strong disposition to commit sexual misconduct and an inability to control behavior that the person is dangerous to society (MHL §§ 10.03[e], 10.07[f]). MHL article 10, as written, is also designed to provide courts with a mechanism for deciding whether the mental condition of a sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality is so extreme that the more restrictive alternative of confinement is warranted or whether, on the other hand, the least restrictive option, namely SIST, is permitted (see MHL § 10.07[f]).

…[I]n Donald DD. …, the Court of Appeals clarified that the State must prove, separate from a finding of mental abnormality required for civil commitment, that the defendant has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Specifically, the State must demonstrate that as a result of the “serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder,” a person also would have serious difficulty controlling his behavior if released (24 NY3d at 187, 189).  Matter of State of New York v Frank P, 2015 NY Slip Op 01551, 1st Dept 2-19-15

 

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