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Plaintiff Breached Contract By Not Being Ready on the Time-of-the-Essence Date and Was Therefore Not Entitled to a Return of the Downpayment/Plaintiff’s “Tortious-Interference-with-Contract” Cause of Action Against Brokers Dismissed Because Sellers Did Not Breach the Contract

In finding plaintiff was not entitled to return of her downpayment because she was not ready to close on the “time-of-the-essence” date, the Second Department explained the relevant analytical criteria, as well as the elements of a tortious interference with contract cause of action:

The sellers established, prima facie, that they were ready, willing, and able to perform on the time-of-the-essence closing date, and that the plaintiff lacked a lawful excuse for her failure to close … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Accordingly, the sellers established that they did not breach the contract and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the return of her down payment … . …

The plaintiff alleged that the brokers tortiously interfered with the contract between the plaintiff and the sellers. The elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with contract are (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional procurement of the third party’s breach of that contract; and (4) damages … . Here, the brokers established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the third-party, i.e., the sellers, did not breach the contract; rather, the plaintiff breached the contract when she did not appear on the time-of-the-essence closing date. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Iacono v Pilavas, 2015 NY Slip Op 01418, 2nd Dept 2-18-15

 

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