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Judge’s Failure to Question Prospective Juror Re: the Juror’s Possible Bias In Favor of Police Officers Was Reversible Error/Prosecutor’s Suggestion in Summation that Simply Being a Defendant Is Evidence of Guilt Was Grounds for Reversal As Well

The First Department reversed defendant's conviction because the trial judge did not further question a juror who indicated bias in favor of police officers.  [The judge, in denying defense counsel's “for cause” challenge, erroneously indicated it was defense counsel's role to question the juror about the juror's ability to be fair.]  In addition, the prosecutor's suggestion in summation that simply being a defendant is evidence of guilt was grounds for reversal:

Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20(1)(b) provides that a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial.” Upon making this type of challenge, “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about [his] ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that [he] can be fair” … . The CPL “does not require any particular expurgatory oath or talismanic words” …, but challenged jurors “must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence” … . Those who have given “less-than-unequivocal assurances of impartiality . . . must be excused” and “[i]f there is any doubt about a prospective juror's impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have replaced one impartial juror with another” … .

In this case, the prospective juror gave a response that was uncertain at best, stating that he did not know and “couldn't say” whether he would be able to judge an officer's credibility as opposed to a civilian witness. * * * Given this ambiguity … it was incumbent upon the trial court to take corrective action to elicit unequivocal assurance from the prospective juror that he would be able to reach a verdict based solely upon the court's instructions on the law … . …

…[T]he prosecutor's summation remarks regarding reasonable doubt also constituted reversible error, as these remarks suggested that the jury should convict based on facts extraneous to the trial. Specifically, the comments “linked [the defendant] to every defendant who turned out to be guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment,” thus inviting the jury to consider his status as a defendant as “evidence tending to prove his guilt” … . Moreover, the prosecutor's comments tended to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for the verdict. These remarks exceed the bounds of permissible advocacy. People v Jones, 2015 NY Slip Op 00797, 1st Dept 2-3-15


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