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Judicial Approval of a Settlement with Third Parties Was Properly Granted After the Expiration of the Statutory Period (Nunc Pro Tunc)—Delay In Seeking Approval Was Not Due to Injured Worker’s Fault or Neglect/Workers’ Compensation Carrier’s Consent to a Settlement Is Required Even Where the Settlement Is Greater than the Amount of the Benefits Received/Absent the Consent of the Carrier, Judicial Approval Is Required

The Second Department determined judicial approval of a settlement with third parties after the statutory period had passed was properly granted nunc pro tunc.  The injured worker received about $189,000 in workers' compensation benefits and eventually settled with third parties for $2,000,000. The workers' compensation carrier sued to collect on its lien.  The court noted that, despite the language of Workers' Compensation Law 29(5), the workers' compensation carrier's consent to a settlement is required even if the amount of the settlement is more than the amount of the benefits. In the absence of such consent (absent here), judicial approval is required (properly granted here):

Workers Compensation Law § 29(5) provides, in pertinent part:

“A compromise of any such cause of action by the employee or his dependents at an amount less than the compensation provided for by this chapter shall be made only with the written approval of . . . the person, association, corporation, or insurance carrier liable to pay the same. However, written approval . . . need not be obtained if the employee or his dependents obtain a compromise order from a justice of the court in which the third-party action was pending. …

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“If the third-party action is on trial at the time the offer of settlement which is acceptable to the plaintiff, is made and either such written approval or order as provided in this subdivision is required, the action may be marked settled subject to the securing of such written approval or such order. If such written approval or such order is not subsequently secured within three months the action shall be restored to the head of the trial day calendar” (emphasis added).

Section 29(5) was enacted to protect an insurance carrier from paying a deficiency between the settlement and the amount paid to the injured party … . As originally enacted, the provision required the consent of the insurance carrier. However, “in many instances, the carrier arbitrarily refused to give its consent to a proposed settlement regardless of how fair or generous the proposal might have been,” prompting the Legislature to amend the provision to provide that consent need not be obtained where there is judicial approval of the settlement … .

Although there is case law which indicates that approval pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 29(5) is not required if the amount of Workers' Compensation benefits received is less than the amount of the settlement …, the Court of Appeals has held that even where the settlement constitutes 100% of the policy limits, approval pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 29(5) is required in order for the claimant to continue to receive Workers' Compensation benefits in the future …. Any settlement is potentially less than the benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Law (see 1-7 New York Workers' Compensation Handbook § 7.01[5] [2014]), especially where, as here, the claimant is seeking a permanent partial disability classification from the Workers' Compensation Board, which could mean that he would be entitled to benefits indefinitely.

“[A] judicial order may be obtained nunc pro tunc approving a previously agreed-upon settlement, even where the application for approval is sought more than three months after the date of settlement, provided that the employee can establish that (1) the amount of the settlement is reasonable, (2) the delay in applying for a judicial order of approval was not caused by the employee's fault or neglect, and (3) the insurance carrier was not prejudiced by the delay” … . Fidelity & Guar Ins Co v Digiacomo, 2015 NY Slip OP 00842, 2nd Dept 2-2-15


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