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Proof Requirements for an Employment-Discrimination Action (Executive Law 296) Explained

In finding that the employer demonstrated a non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff, the Third Department explained the employment-discrimination proof requirements and analytical criteria under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law 296 (1)(a)):

To support a prima facie case of discrimination under the Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]), a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he [or she] is a member of the class protected by the statute; (2) that he [or she] was actively or constructive discharged; (3) that he [or she] was qualified to hold the position from which he [or she] was terminated; and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of . . . discrimination” … . Assuming that low threshold is met, “[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by clearly setting forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision” … . If, in turn, the employer proffers the required nondiscriminatory reasons, “the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment by proving that the employer’s stated reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination by demonstrating both that the stated reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason” … . “Notably, a challenge by a discharged employee to the correctness of an employer’s decision does not, without more, give rise to the inference that the employee’s discharge was due to . . . discrimination” … . Stated another way, “[i]t is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the employer made an unwise business decision, or an unnecessary personnel move. Nor is it enough to show that the employer acted arbitrarily or with ill will. These facts, even if demonstrated, do not necessarily show that [discrimination] was a motivating factor. [A] [p]laintiff cannot meet his [or her] burden of proving pretext simply by refuting or questioning the defendant[‘s] articulated reason” for terminating the plaintiff’s employment … . Miranda v ESA Hudson Val Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 00670, 3rd Dept 1-29-15

 

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