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Right-to-Intervene Criteria Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)

The Second Department described the criteria for intervening in an action (criteria not met here):

Upon a timely motion, a person is permitted to intervene in an action as of right, “1. when a statute of the state confers an absolute right to intervene; or 2. when the representation of the person’s interest by the parties is or may be inadequate and the person is or may be bound by the judgment; or 3. when the action involves the disposition or distribution of, or the title or a claim for damages for injury to, property and the person may be affected adversely by the judgment” (CPLR 1012[a]). Additionally, upon a timely motion, the court, in its discretion, may permit a person to intervene, “when a statute of the state confers a right to intervene . . . or when the person’s claim or defense and the main action have a common question of law or fact” (CPLR 1013). In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay the determination of the action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party (see id.).  Wells Fargo Bank NA v Mazzara, 2015 NY Slip Op 00750, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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