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Access to Financial Support from Family Properly Considered In Calculating Father’s Child Support and Child Care Obligations

The Second Department explained that Family Court properly imputed income to the father based upon access to financial support from his family:

Pursuant to Family Court Act § 413(1)(b)(5)(iv), the Family Court is entitled to impute income to a parent based upon various factors, including “money, goods, or services provided by relatives and friends” (Family Ct Act § 413[1][b][5][iv][D]). Here, the Family Court properly determined that the father has access to, and receives, financial support from his family. Considering, among other things, the father’s employment history, his monthly expenses, and the resources provided to him by his own father over a number of years, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in imputing income to the father in the sum of $30,000 per year for the purpose of calculating his child support and child care obligations … . Matter of Recco v Turbak, 2015 NY Slip Op 00770, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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