You are here: / / Inference of Defendant’s Negligence Was Not “Inescapable”—Summary...

Inference of Defendant’s Negligence Was Not “Inescapable”—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted to Plaintiff Pursuant to the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  Plaintiff was struck by a box which fell from a shelf in a retail store.  The evidence submitted by the plaintiff did not make the inference of defendant’s negligence “inescapable:”

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of an accident” … . Since “the circumstantial evidence allows but does not require the jury to infer that the defendant was negligent . . . res ipsa loquitur evidence does not ordinarily or automatically entitle the plaintiff to summary judgment . . . even if the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence is unrefuted” … . “[O]nly in the rarest of res ipsa loquitur cases may a plaintiff win summary judgment” … . “That would happen only when the plaintiff’s circumstantial proof is so convincing and the defendant’s response so weak that the inference of defendant’s negligence is inescapable” … .

Here, the plaintiffs’ submissions on the issue of res ipsa loquitur were insufficient to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs did not establish, by sufficiently convincing circumstantial proof, “that the inference of defendant’s negligence is inescapable” … . Hoeberlein v Bed Bath & Beyond, 2015 NY Slip Op 00497, 2nd Dept 1-21-15

 

You might also like
“Voluntary Payment Doctrine” Explained and Applied to Preclude Recovery
UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT.
PLAINTIFF SUED DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS ALLEGING INACCURATE ADVICE CAUSED HER TO FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY, BECAUSE THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ACCRUED WHEN PLAINTIFF FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY, THE LAWSUIT BECAME PART OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE AND PLAINTIFF WAS THEREBY STRIPPED OF THE CAPACITY TO SUE (SECOND DEPT).
Cause of Action Based Upon a Legal Theory Which Could Have Been Raised in a Prior Action Stemming from the Same Events Precluded by the Doctrine of Res Judicata
Failure to Cooperate with Probation Department Is Valid Reason for Enhanced Sentence
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE FOREIGN CORPORATION WAS DOING BUSINESS IN NEW YORK WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND VIOLENT CONDUCT MISBEHAVIOR DETERMINATIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE DESTROYED THE UNDERGROUND OIL TANKS WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE LEAKED, CONTAMINATING PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY; HOWEVER THE DEFENDANT OIL COMPANIES DID NOT DEMONSRTATE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TANKS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE A DEFENSE; THEREFORE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION, NOT THE STRIKING OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Twenty-Day Time-Limit for Making an Application to Stay Arbitration Starts When... Conviction Reversed Because Court Failed to Inquire About the Reasons for Defendant’s...