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Inference of Defendant’s Negligence Was Not “Inescapable”—Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted to Plaintiff Pursuant to the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  Plaintiff was struck by a box which fell from a shelf in a retail store.  The evidence submitted by the plaintiff did not make the inference of defendant’s negligence “inescapable:”

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of an accident” … . Since “the circumstantial evidence allows but does not require the jury to infer that the defendant was negligent . . . res ipsa loquitur evidence does not ordinarily or automatically entitle the plaintiff to summary judgment . . . even if the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence is unrefuted” … . “[O]nly in the rarest of res ipsa loquitur cases may a plaintiff win summary judgment” … . “That would happen only when the plaintiff’s circumstantial proof is so convincing and the defendant’s response so weak that the inference of defendant’s negligence is inescapable” … .

Here, the plaintiffs’ submissions on the issue of res ipsa loquitur were insufficient to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs did not establish, by sufficiently convincing circumstantial proof, “that the inference of defendant’s negligence is inescapable” … . Hoeberlein v Bed Bath & Beyond, 2015 NY Slip Op 00497, 2nd Dept 1-21-15

 

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