In affirming Family Court’s denial of mother’s petition to relocate, the Third Department noted that Family Court wrongly used “change in circumstances” as the criteria for analyzing the petition when it should have used “the best interests of the child” as the sole criterium. The Third Department exercised its power to make its own factual analysis. The court further noted that the Lincoln hearing in which the children testified was improperly conducted because counsel for mother and father were present and the transcribed proceedings were not sealed. The court explained that the procedure used for Article 10 hearings, where counsel for the parties are present, should not be confused with the procedure for Article 6 hearings, where confidentiality is paramount:
As the mother contends, Family Court applied the incorrect standard in dismissing the relocation petition on the ground that the mother had failed to show a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification. No change in circumstances must be established to support a relocation petition, as the planned move itself is accepted as such … . Instead, the parent who wishes to relocate bears the burden of establishing that the proposed move is in the best interests of the children, a determination based upon such factors as the parents’ reasons for seeking or opposing relocation, the quality of the children’s relationships with each parent, the feasibility of developing a visitation schedule that will permit the children to retain meaningful relationships with the parent who does not move, the degree to which the move may offer economic, emotional and educational benefits for the relocating parent and the children, and the effect of the relocation on extended family relationships … . Although that analysis was not conducted here, this Court’s authority is as broad as that of Family Court, and the record is sufficiently complete to permit us to make the relocation determination based upon our independent review … . * * *
…[W]e note that Family Court conducted what was described as a “modified” Lincoln hearing, in which counsel for both parents were permitted to be present during the court’s interview with the children. The transcript of the interview was not sealed, and was included in full in the appellate record. Neither the presence of counsel other than the attorney for the children during the interview nor the failure to seal the transcript was proper. We reiterate that the right to confidentiality during a Lincoln hearing belongs to the child and is superior to the rights or preferences of the parents … . A child who is explaining the reasons for his or her preference in custody or visitation proceedings “should not be placed in the position of having [his or her] relationship with either parent further jeopardized by having to publicly relate [his or her] difficulties with them or be required to openly choose between them” … . We address this issue recognizing that, in the course of practice, confusion may have resulted from the different procedure followed during Family Ct Act article 10 proceedings, in which the presence of the parties’ counsel during an in camera interview with a child may be permissible due to the fundamental right of litigants in such proceedings to confront their accusers. Although these interviews have sometimes been inaccurately referred to as Lincoln hearings, they are conducted for entirely different purposes than the confidential interviews conducted during custody and visitation proceedings … . For the court to fulfill its primary responsibility of protecting the welfare and interests of a child in the context of a Family Ct Act article 6 proceeding, protecting the child’s right to confidentiality remains a paramount obligation … . Matter of Julie E v David E, 2015 NY Slip OP 00254, 3rd Dept 1-8-15