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Release Which Specifically Refers to a Particular Incident Relates Solely to that Incident—Where Terms of the Release Are Unambiguous, Extrinsic Evidence Will Not Be Considered

The Fourth Department determined that a release unambiguously related solely to a particular slip and fall on a particular day and did not bar an action based upon a subsequent slip and fall:

…[T]he release stated that defendant, in exchange for providing plaintiff with the agreed-upon settlement amount, was “released and forever discharged . . . from all manner of actions, causes of action, suits, . . . claims and demands whatsoever” that plaintiff “ever had, now has or which [her] successors and assigns, heirs, executors or administrators, hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of those present . . . More specifically, for injuries sustained in a slip and fall incident which occurred on June 3, 2009, in the City of Lackawanna, County of Erie and State of New York.” Defendant made payment on the settlement and filed a copy of the stipulation of discontinuance in November 2012.

“It is well settled that a general release is governed by principles of contract law’ … and that, where a release is unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the plain language of the agreement’ … . Moreover, “[i]t has long been the law that where a release contains a recital of a particular claim, obligation or controversy and there is nothing on the face of the instrument other than general words of release to show that anything more than the matters particularly specified was intended to be discharged, the general words of release are deemed to be limited thereby’ … . Thus, “[w]here, as here, [a] release . . . contain[s] specific recitals as to the claims being released, and yet [contains] . . . an omnibus clause to the effect that the releasor releases and discharges all claims and demands whatsoever which he [or she] . . . may have against the releasee . . . , the courts have often applied the rule of ejusdem generis[, i.e., “of the same kind or class” (Black’s Law Dictionary 594 [9th ed 2009])], and held that the general words of a release are limited by the recital of a particular claim” … .

Here, we conclude that the language of the release is unambiguous in specifying that the only claims discharged thereby are those arising from the injuries plaintiff allegedly sustained in the first slip and fall accident … . Contrary to defendant’s further contention that we should consider extrinsic evidence purportedly demonstrating that the parties intended the settlement to cover both matters, “[i]t is well settled that, where the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, effect will be given to the intention of the parties as indicated by the language employed and the fact that one of the parties may have intended something else is irrelevant” … . Abdulla v Gross, 2015 NY Slip Op 00036, 4th Dept 1-2-15

 

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