T-Shirts With the Victim’s Photo Worn by Family Members During the Murder Trial Did Not Deprive Defendant of a Fair Trial

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller, over a dissent, determined that defendant was not denied a fair trial because the victim's family wore T-shirts “remembering” the victim in the courtroom:

The court stated that “it would be appropriate to make a better record of what the shirt was. It was [a] white tee shirt with a silk screen with a picture of the deceased with some written language on it.” The court stated that the shirts “weren't inflammatory.” The court had “noticed that shirt” previously, but it “couldn't read what was written on it.” The court stated that the members of the Walton family “sat in the second row of the audience” and that the T-shirts were “not flauntily [sic] displayed in front of the jury, nor . . . did any members of the family bring undue attention to [them].” The court further stated that “most of the members of the family had an outer garment on top of the tee-shirt” so that the jury “wasn't even capable of seeing the entire thing.” The court noted that “[w]hen counsel made the objection, [it] responded and made a record at that time indicating that [it] saw nothing wrong with those shirts.” The court concluded that the conduct of Walton's family had “not inflamed” the jury.

A criminal defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions (see US Const, Sixth Amend; NY Const, art I, § 1). “The requirement that a jury's verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury” … . “[O]ne accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial” … .  * * *

…[A] trial free from a “coercive . . . atmosphere” is a “fundamental principle of due process [that] is well established” … . It has long been recognized in this State that such an atmosphere of coercion may arise through the conduct of spectators: “[i]t is not to be tolerated that men [or women] should go into such a place and manifest their feelings, prejudices or passions, for the purpose of exerting an influence upon those who sit in judgment upon the rights of parties” … .

However, “[t]he safeguards of juror impartiality . . . are not infallible [and] it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote” … . “Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen” … .

A trial court, which is in the best position to detect and evaluate the danger that spectator conduct may present to the integrity of the trial process, has a constitutional duty to monitor the atmosphere of the courtroom to ensure that the jury is not exposed to spectator conduct that poses a coercive threat to the jury's ability to remain impartial (see US Const, Sixth Amend; NY Const, art I, § 1…). * * *

… [W]hether any particular conduct, or a court's response to it, has violated a defendant's right to an impartial jury, depends on the particular circumstances of each case … . Such circumstances may include the nature of the crime and the evidence adduced at trial, the nature of the spectator conduct, and the degree to which the jury was exposed to such conduct. It is not necessary for an actual prejudicial effect on the jury to be established … . Ultimately, “the question is whether the [spectator conduct] presents an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play in the jury's consideration of the case” … . People v Nelson, 2014 NY Slip OP 09019, 2nd Dept 12-24-14