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Although There Was Evidence the Plaintiff Failed to Yield the Right-of-Way, There Was a Triable Question of Fact Whether Defendant Could Have Taken Steps to Avoid the Collision

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court finding that, although there was evidence failed to yield the right-of-way in violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law 1142 (a), defendant (Tiao) failed to demonstrate the absence of comparative fault on his part:

A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey traffic laws that require them to yield (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141…). Moreover, a driver is negligent where he has failed to see that which through proper use of his senses he should have seen … . At the same time, a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident … . “There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” …, and the issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the jury to decide … . Thus, a movant seeking summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from comparative fault … .

In support of their motion, the defendants relied upon, inter alia, the deposition transcripts of the plaintiff and Tiao. While the defendants submitted evidence that the plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way to their vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), their submissions in support of their motion failed to establish Tiao’s freedom from comparative fault and that the plaintiff’s violation was the sole proximate cause of the accident… . Tiao recalled at his deposition that, prior to entering the intersection, when he was about five to eight feet therefrom, he observed the plaintiff’s vehicle stopped at the stop sign on 72nd Street. Thereafter, he testified that three to four seconds elapsed between his seeing the plaintiff’s vehicle initially and the collision. Tiao did not testify as to the movement of the plaintiff’s vehicle from the point he initially observed it to the point of impact between the vehicles, and he admitted that he could not recall where he was looking at the point of impact. He further admitted that he did not take any evasive action to avoid the impact with the plaintiff’s vehicle in the intersection. Based on Tiao’s testimony, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Tiao took reasonable care to avoid the collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle in the intersection… . Arias v Tiao, 2014 NY Slip Op 08796, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

Similar issue and result in Canales v Arichabala, 2014 NY Slip Op 08803, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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