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Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants Exempt from a Consistency Review Under New York’s Coastal Management Program—No State Environmental Impact Statements Required—Federal Environmental Impact Statements Prepared in the 1970’s Deemed Sufficient to Trigger the Exemption Under the Plain Meaning of the Statutory and Regulatory Language

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Clark, determined that the petitioners, owners and operators of Indian Point nuclear power plants seeking renewal of operating licenses, were exempt from New York’s Coastal Management Program (CMP).  The court explained that the plain language of the relevant statutes and regulations did not require the preparation of environmental impact statements pursuant to New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), as the Department of State and the lower court had ruled. The fact that environmental impact statements had been prepared in the 1970’s under the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was deemed sufficient to trigger the exemption:

Petitioners particularly focus upon the second exemption in the CMP, which exempts from consistency review “those projects for which a final [e]nvironmental [i]mpact [s]tatement has been prepared prior to the effective date of the Department of State [p]art 600 regulations … .” 19 NYCRR part 600 took effect in 1982. Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 went into operation prior to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]) taking effect in 1976 and, as such, environmental impact statements were not prepared under SEQRA. Final environmental impact statements were prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC § 4321 et seq. [hereinafter NEPA]), however, and statements were completed for Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 in 1972 and 1975, respectively. Accordingly, applying the plain meaning of the language in the CMP, Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 are exempt from consistency review.

The Department nevertheless held that the exemption did not apply to Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 because their final environmental impact statements had not been prepared pursuant to SEQRA. There is simply no basis in law for injecting such a requirement. The Department noted that 19 NYCRR 600.3 (d) is cited in the exemption and refers to final environmental impact statements prepared under the SEQRA regulatory regime, but that regime permits the use of final environmental impact statements prepared under NEPA (see 6 NYCRR 617.2 [n]; 617.15 [a]; Philip Weinberg, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 17½, ECL 8-0111). Indeed, SEQRA is modeled upon NEPA, and there is no indication that the final environmental impact statements prepared for Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 would not have complied with SEQRA … . Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operation Inc v New York State Dept of State, 2014 NY Slip Op 08702, 3rd Dept 12-11-14

 

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