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The Arresting Officer’s Stepping in Front of the Appellant As the Appellant Walked Away Was Not a Seizure But Rather Was a Continuation of the Officer’s Common-Law Right to Inquire

The Second Department determined the police officer who followed appellant as appellant walked away from him and then stepped in front of appellant acted properly.  Suppression of the handgun seized from appellant after a pat down search, therefore, was not required. The arresting officer responded to a call describing a disturbance at a restaurant.  The officer saw the appellant leave the restaurant and noticed a bulge in appellant's jacket pocket.  The officer then began following the appellant and eventually caught up to him (and stepped in front of him).  The court found that the officer's stepping in front of the appellant was not a seizure, but rather was a continuation of the officer's common-law right to inquire:

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the totality of the circumstances gave the officers a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, which gave rise to the officers' common-law right to inquire … . While the appellant is correct that, initially, he had a constitutional right ” to be let alone' and to refuse to respond to police inquiry” …, under the circumstances presented here, the arresting officer's conduct in following and stepping in front of the appellant in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer's own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure … . Hence, the conduct of the arresting officer in this regard was not improper.

Moreover, although the appellant continued to walk away from the arresting officer, the arresting officer kept pace with him, and ultimately approached him until they were only an arm's length away from each other. As such, it was proper for the officer to request that the appellant make his hands visible as a reasonable precautionary measure … . Additionally, from this close proximity, the officer observed what appeared to be the outline of a firearm in the appellant's right jacket pocket, which appeared to be pointed at the officer, placing him in fear for his safety. The officer thus properly conducted a limited pat-down search to determine if the bulge was a weapon … . Matter of Shariff H, 2014 NY Slip Op 08435, 2nd Dept 12-3-14

 

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