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Plaintiff Was Injured When an Anvil Fell Out of a Co-Worker’s Vehicle When Plaintiff Opened the Tailgate to Retrieve a Hat—Because Retrieving the Hat Was Work-Related, Plaintiff Was Unable to Sue the Defendant In Negligence (Failure to Warn Re: the Anvil) Under the Theory that Placement of the Anvil in the Vehicle Was Not Work-Related

The Third Department determined the exclusive-remedy aspect of the Workers’ Compensation Law required the dismissal of a negligence suit.  Plaintiff and defendant were co-employees, horse trainers.  While they were working, plaintiff asked defendant for a hat because she was chilled.  Defendant gave plaintiff the keys to his vehicle, telling her the hat was in the rear cargo area. Plaintiff opened the tailgate of the vehicle and an anvil fell out, injuring her foot.  Although plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits, she argued she should be able to sue under a negligence theory because the defendant’s placing an anvil in his vehicle had nothing to do with work.  The Third Department held that, because the request for a hat was work-related, the negligence suit was properly dismissed:

Whether defendant’s actions were “within the scope of employment or purely personal” involves an assessment of whether they were “both reasonable and sufficiently work related under the circumstances” … . While at work, defendant offered to lend an uncomfortable coworker a hat and, because “some advantage to the employer, even though slight, can be discovered in [that] conduct, his act cannot be regarded as purely personal and wholly unrelated to his employment” … . Notwithstanding the lack of any connection between the anvil and defendant’s employment, he was “acting within the scope of his employment” when he lent plaintiff the hat — and allegedly committed a tortious act by failing to warn plaintiff that objects may fall if she opened the tailgate — so as to trigger the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law… .  Correa v Anderson, 2014 NY Slip Op 08093, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

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