You are here: / / Questions of Fact Raised About Whether Premarital Agreement Was the Product...
,

Questions of Fact Raised About Whether Premarital Agreement Was the Product of Overreaching

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court, finding that defendant-wife had raised a question of fact about the validity and enforceability of the premarital agreement.  The agreement purported to resolve all financial issues in the event of divorce and entitled defendant-wife only to a payment of $25,000.00 for each year of marriage.  Plaintiff-husband had assets of $10,000,000.00 and defendant-wife had assets of $170,000.00 at the time of the marriage:

An agreement between spouses or prospective spouses should be closely scrutinized, and may be set aside upon a showing that it is unconscionable, or the result of fraud, or where it is shown to be manifestly unfair to one spouse because of overreaching on the part of the other spouse … . Such an agreement may be invalidated if the party challenging the agreement demonstrates that it was the product of fraud, duress, or other inequitable conduct … .

There is evidence that the defendant was not represented by independent counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the allegedly “take-it-or-leave-it” premarital agreement that is the subject of this appeal. In addition, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the preprinted financial forms executed by the parties do not demonstrate that they were expecting to enter into a premarital agreement, as the forms recite that they were furnished by a commercial bank in connection with an application for a mortgage. The defendant therefore raised triable issues of fact as to whether the premarital agreement was the product of overreaching, such that it would be rendered unenforceable … . Bibeau v Sudick, 2014 NY Slip Op 07608, 2nd Dept 11-12-14

 

You might also like
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND IRRELEVANT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE REQUIRED REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).
NO APPEAL LIES FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST THE PORT AUTHORITY, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE NOTICE OF CLAIM MUST BE SERVED AT LEAST 60 DAYS BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION (NOT 60 DAYS AFTER THE ACCRUAL OF THE ACTION); THEREFORE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY SERVED (SECOND DEPT). ​
BRIEF PARTICIPATION IN JURY DELIBERATIONS BY AN ALTERNATE WHILE A SWORN JUROR WAS ABSENT VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY OF 12, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE THE CREDIT CARD BILLING STATEMENTS AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT WERE MAILED TO THE DEFENDANT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT AND ACCOUNT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH BY THE BANK; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE “COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTION;” BUT THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING WHICH LED TO DEFENDANT’S DWI ARREST WAS “COMMENSURATE WITH ANY PERCEIVED NEED FOR ASSISTANCE;” INDICTMENT DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED (1) THE PROTRUDING PIPE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS, (2) THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK, AND (3) THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION PROHIBITING THE ACCUMULATION OF DEBRIS DID NOT APPLY; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Individual Defendants’ Ties to New York, Including Business Activities... Gifts from One Spouse to the Other Are Marital Property Subject to Equitable...