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Unambiguous Terms of a Release Must Be Enforced—Extrinsic Evidence of Intent Not Permitted

In affirming the dismissal of a complaint which was deemed barred by the terms of a release, the Second Department explained the criteria for the analysis of a release:

Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release … . A release is “governed by principles of contract law” …, and one “that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” … .

The plain language of a release is controlling, “regardless of one party’s claim that he [or she] intended something else” … . Where the scope of the release is unambiguous, “the court may not look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent” … . “Whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts” …. Sicuranza v Philip Howard Apts Tenants Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 07143, 2nd Dept 10-22-14

 

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