You are here: / / Evidence of Prior Crimes Improperly Admitted to Prove Identity and Intent—There...
,

Evidence of Prior Crimes Improperly Admitted to Prove Identity and Intent—There Was No Unique Modus Operandi Which Would Prove Identity and Intent Could Be Inferred from the Commission of the Acts Charged

The Second Department reversed defendant’s convictions because the trial court allowed evidence of prior uncharged crimes to provide identity and intent.  The Second Department explained that the crimes did not have a unique modus operandi which could demonstrate the identity of the perpetrator, and the intent to commit the crime (burglary) could readily be inferred from the commission of the acts charged:

Evidence of another crime committed by the defendant, not charged in the indictment, is not admissible if it tends only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged and cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case … . However, where the proffered evidence is relevant to some material fact in the case, other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, it is not to be excluded merely because it shows that the defendant had committed other crimes … . Thus, evidence of other crimes may be admitted to show, among other things, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan, or the identity of the guilty party … . Here, the County Court granted the People’s application to admit the subject evidence to establish the defendant’s identity through a unique modus operandi and to establish the defendant’s intent.

The identity exception to the Molineux rule “is used in limited circumstances, when the defendant employs some unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi in an uncharged crime that is relevant to proving his identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged” … . Although identity was at issue in this case …, the People failed to identify any distinctive modus operandi relevant to proving the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes charged. In order to identify the defendant by a distinctive modus operandi, “it is not sufficient to show that he has committed similar acts if the method used is not uncommon,” as such a showing “would be of little probative value in determining whether he committed the crimes charged, and the prejudice would be obvious” … . * * *

Nor was the subject evidence properly admitted under the intent exception to the Molineux rule. Evidence of prior misconduct to prove intent is unnecessary where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act itself … . Under the circumstances here, the defendant’s intent could be easily inferred from his acts alone … . Moreover, the defendant did not contest the element of intent before the jury, but rather, denied that he was the person who attempted the burglaries … . The evidence therefore was improperly ruled admissible. People v Wright, 2014 NY Slip Op 07003, 2nd Dept 10-15-14

 

You might also like
Criteria for Restarting the Statute of Limitations by Acknowledging a Debt Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)
THE ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF A STREET FRONTAGE VARIANCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC FACTUAL FINDINGS MAKING COURT-REVIEW IMPOSSIBLE; MATTER REMITTED TO THE BOARD (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER, WHO ALLEGEDLY MADE A TURN IN FRONT OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST, SAW WHAT WAS THERE TO BE SEEN (SECOND DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH FATHER DEMONSTRATED HIS FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT WAS NOT WILLFUL, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED A MONEY JUDGMENT BASED ON HIS FAILURE TO OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE EVIDENCE IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS ONE OF THE ROBBERS WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT BUT DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Declaratory Judgment Finding that the Insurer Was Not Obligated to Defend or Indemnify the Insured Precluded, Under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, Suit by Plaintiff Against the Insurer—Plaintiff Was In Privity with the Insured Pursuant to Insurance Law 3420 and Had No Greater Rights than the Insured
JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO SIGN A PROPOSED ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
MANUFACTURER AND SELLER OF THE PRODUCT WHICH ALLEGEDLY INJURED INFANT PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE THE PARENTS FOR CONTRIBUTION ON A THEORY OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INFANT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Failure to Submit Expert Affidavit In Support of Meterological Data Precluded... Resentencing Under Drug Law Reform Act Is Available to a Persistent Felony Offender...