Evidence of Prior Crimes Improperly Admitted to Prove Identity and Intent—There Was No Unique Modus Operandi Which Would Prove Identity and Intent Could Be Inferred from the Commission of the Acts Charged

The Second Department reversed defendant’s convictions because the trial court allowed evidence of prior uncharged crimes to provide identity and intent.  The Second Department explained that the crimes did not have a unique modus operandi which could demonstrate the identity of the perpetrator, and the intent to commit the crime (burglary) could readily be inferred from the commission of the acts charged:

Evidence of another crime committed by the defendant, not charged in the indictment, is not admissible if it tends only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged and cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case … . However, where the proffered evidence is relevant to some material fact in the case, other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, it is not to be excluded merely because it shows that the defendant had committed other crimes … . Thus, evidence of other crimes may be admitted to show, among other things, motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan, or the identity of the guilty party … . Here, the County Court granted the People’s application to admit the subject evidence to establish the defendant’s identity through a unique modus operandi and to establish the defendant’s intent.

The identity exception to the Molineux rule “is used in limited circumstances, when the defendant employs some unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi in an uncharged crime that is relevant to proving his identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged” … . Although identity was at issue in this case …, the People failed to identify any distinctive modus operandi relevant to proving the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes charged. In order to identify the defendant by a distinctive modus operandi, “it is not sufficient to show that he has committed similar acts if the method used is not uncommon,” as such a showing “would be of little probative value in determining whether he committed the crimes charged, and the prejudice would be obvious” … . * * *

Nor was the subject evidence properly admitted under the intent exception to the Molineux rule. Evidence of prior misconduct to prove intent is unnecessary where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act itself … . Under the circumstances here, the defendant’s intent could be easily inferred from his acts alone … . Moreover, the defendant did not contest the element of intent before the jury, but rather, denied that he was the person who attempted the burglaries … . The evidence therefore was improperly ruled admissible. People v Wright, 2014 NY Slip Op 07003, 2nd Dept 10-15-14