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Allowing the Prosecutor to Tell the Jury in Summation that the Person Who Provided the Police with a Tip Must Have Identified the Defendant as the Perpetrator Was Reversible Error—The Prosecutor Effectively Told the Jury Another “Witness” Had Identified the Defendant, But that “Witness” Did Not Testify and Could Not, Therefore, Be Cross-Examined

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor, in summation, had improperly been allowed to tell the jury that the person who provided the police with a tip must have identified the defendant as the perpetrator.  Because the person who provided the tip did not testify, the defendant was effectively deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine a “witness against him:”

During summation, the prosecutor strongly implied that whoever had provided the tip had implicated the defendant: “Someone calls 577-TIPS . . . . [The detective] gets this information and where does he go? 82-01 Rockaway Beach Boulevard, make a left out of the elevator. I’m looking for a guy named Rick who lives on the sixth floor. Ricardo Benitez.” After defense counsel’s objection to this remark was overruled, the prosecutor continued: “Gave Detective Lopez the following address. 82-01 Rockaway Beach Boulevard, 6B. Rick. Ladies and gentlemen, I introduce you to Rick.” Defense counsel again objected, but the Supreme Court again overruled the objection.

The only purpose of the prosecutor’s improper comments was to suggest to the jury, in this one-witness identification case, that the complainant was not the only person who had implicated the defendant in the commission of the robbery (see People v Mendez, 22 AD3d 688, 689). Moreover, in overruling defense counsel’s objections, the Supreme Court “legitimized” the prosecutor’s improper remarks (People v Lloyd, 115 AD3d 766, 769). The defendant, of course, was given no opportunity to cross-examine the unnamed witness who had allegedly provided the tip … . The evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming, so there is no basis for the application of harmless error analysis … . To the extent that the defendant failed to preserve the claim by specific objection, we reach the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction, and reverse the judgment … . People v Benitez, 2014 NY Slip Op 05890, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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