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Plaintiff Should Have Been Allowed to Add Doctor to Medical Malpractice Action After the Statute of Limitations Had Run—All the Relation-Back Criteria Were Met

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, found that the relation-back doctrine allowed the addition of a doctor (Persky) to a malpractice action after the statute of limitations had run.  Several notes in decedent’s medical records were signed by the doctor and the decedent died soon after she was discharged from the hospital, which plaintiff alleged was premature.  The court explained the relevant law:

“The relation-back doctrine, which is codified in CPLR 203(b), allows a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended complaint to relate back to claims previously asserted against a codefendant for statute of limitations purposes where the two defendants are united in interest'” … . In order for a claim asserted against a new defendant to relate back to the date the claim was filed against another defendant, the plaintiff must establish that (1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence; (2) the new defendant is united in interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with notice of the institution of the action such that he or she will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits; and (3) the new defendant knew or should have know that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him or her as well … . “The linchpin’ of the relation-back doctrine is whether the new defendant had notice within the applicable limitations period” … .

it was not reasonable for Persky to conclude that the plaintiff intended to proceed only against the defendants named in the original summons and complaint, especially since the decedent died soon after she was discharged from the hospital, and the complaint asserted specific allegations of negligence relating to the decedent’s premature hospital discharge … . In addition, contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff demonstrated that the failure to originally name Persky as a defendant was the result of a mistake, and there was no need to show that such mistake was excusable … . Roseman v Baranowski, 2014 NY Slip Op 05635, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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