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Distinction Between New York College Funds, Which Are Protected Against Creditors, and College Funds Established in Other States, Which Are Not Protected, Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause

The Second Department determined that a college fund established under the laws of New Hampshire, unlike a college fund established under the laws of New York, was not entitled to the protection from creditors afforded by CPLR 5205.  The distinction between New York funds and funds established in other states was deemed to be constitutional:

The parties do not dispute that the protection from creditors afforded by CPLR 5205(j)(2) to college tuition savings program accounts defined in 26 USC § 529 (hereinafter 529 savings plans) does not apply where, as here, the accounts are not qualified college savings program accounts established pursuant to the New York State College Choice Tuition Saving Program, as set forth in Education Law article 14-A. The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the distinction made in CPLR 5205(j) between 529 savings plans established under the laws of New York, and those established in other states, or under the laws of other states, does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Since the classification “is not based on an inherently suspect characteristic and does not impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, it need only rationally further a legitimate state interest to be upheld as constitutional” … . Applying this standard of rational basis review, the court properly determined that CPLR 5205(j) was not unconstitutional, as the disparate treatment is not ” so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes'” as to be irrational … . County Bank v Broderick, 2014 NY Slip Op 05621, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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