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Reversible Error to Instruct the Jury On an Affirmative Defense Over Defense Counsel’s Objection

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s intentional murder conviction because the trial judge, in response to a question from the jury, instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of renunciation over defense counsel’s objection.  The court explained the relevant law:

It is well settled that a court cannot instruct a jury on an affirmative defense where the defendant objects to the instruction … . When a court does so, it impairs a defendant’s “unquestionabl[e] . . . right to chart his [or her] own defense” …; it may “undermine[] the defense chosen by [the] defendant[,] . . . [and] place[] [the] defendant in the midst of contradictory defenses” …; and it indisputably “impose[s] on [the] defendant an affirmative burden of proof he [or she] had not undertaken by his [or her] defense theory” … . The imposition of a burden of proof on a defendant who has not elected to pursue an affirmative defense “constitute[s] an abuse of the affirmative defense in deorgation of [a] defendant’s right to have the State bear the entire burden of proof” … . The 3rd Department has even stated that a court “is without the jurisdiction to, sua sponte, instruct the jury on an affirmative defense or force a defendant to raise such a defense” … .

Where, as here, the defendant has repeatedly advanced only a defense, which carries no burden of proof, “the suggestion that he [or she] had assumed a burden of proof . . . ha[s] the potential to mislead the jury” … . The affirmative defense of renunciation requires a defendant to meet an initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence …, that he or she “withdrew from participation in such offense prior to the commission thereof and made a substantial effort to prevent the commission thereof” (Penal Law § 40.10 [1] [emphasis added]). There was no evidence presented at trial that defendant made any effort, let alone a substantial one, to prevent the commission of the murder. The only conclusion the jury could have drawn was that defendant had failed to meet his burden of establishing the affirmative defense. Here…, “[t]he imposition of an affirmative burden of proof over defense objection and the involuntary undermining of the defendant’s chosen defense strategy resulted in serious prejudice that requires reversal”… . People v Brewer, 2014 NY Slip Op 04606, 4th Dept 6-20-14

 

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