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Tax Assessment Reductions Can Be Sought Solely through a Tax Certiorari Proceeding Under the Real Property Tax Law, Not Through an Article 78 Proceeding

The Second Department determined the procedure under the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) was the only avenue available to petitioner to seek a reduction of tax assessments.  Petitioner had successfully challenged the tax assessments for the 2006/2007 tax year and then sought a reduction for the following year in an Article 78 proceeding.  The Second Department determined petitioner should have sought reductions for all the relevant tax years within the time limits of RPTL 702(2) and could not use an Article 78 proceeding to collaterally attack the assessment:

“Ordinarily, the proper method for challenging excessive or unlawful real property tax assessments is by the commencement of a tax certiorari proceeding pursuant to article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law” … . Such a proceeding is properly commenced after exhaustion of the administrative grievance remedies, and within 30 days after the filing of the final assessment roll (see RPTL 702[2]…). An “excessive assessment” subject to review pursuant to RPTL article 7 includes an assessment of a special assessing unit that fails to comply with the limitations on increases in assessed value set forth in RPTL 1805 (see RPTL 701[4][d]; 706[1]…).

Collateral attacks on assessments are proper where the jurisdiction of the taxing authority is challenged, the tax itself is claimed to be unconstitutional …, or the challenge is to “the method employed in the assessment of several properties rather than the overvaluation or undervaluation of specific properties” … . None of these exceptions to the exclusive applicability of RPTL article 7 are present here, since the petitioner challenged, as excessive, the assessments of specific parcels of property by virtue of the appellants’ failure to comply with RPTL 1805 (see RPTL 701[4][d]).

The petitioner contends that, nonetheless, the commencement of a CPLR article 78 proceeding within the time provided for by CPLR 217 is the proper vehicle by which to compel the requested transition assessments because recalculation of the 2007/2008 assessments only became necessary after the assessments for the previous tax year were reduced by the Supreme Court and that reduction was affirmed pursuant to our decision and order in Matter of Rainbow Diner v Board of Assessors (71 AD3d 901). We reject this contention, since the petitioner was required to timely exhaust administrative remedies applicable to tax certiorari proceedings, and its challenge was subject to the limitations period of RPTL 702(2). Matter of Jonsher Realty Corp/Melba Inc v Board of Assessors, 2014 NY Slip Op 04195, 2nd Dept 6-11-14

 

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