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Where There Is Evidence, Other than or in Addition to a Chemical Test, of a Blood Alcohol Content, the Jury Can Be Instructed that It May Base Its Verdict on Its Own Finding Re: Blood Alcohol Content

The Court of Appeals determined defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction that a “blood alcohol content of less that .08 is prima facie evidence defendant was not intoxicated” on the basis of her expert's testimony that her blood alcohol content was below .08 at the time she was driving (her subsequent blood alcohol test result was .09).  However, the Court of Appeals explained the defendant could have requested a jury instruction which would allow the jury to find she was not intoxicated if the jury first made the finding her blood alcohol level was below .08:

Since the evidence of her BAC that defendant presented here was not determined by a chemical test but was contained in the opinion of a defense expert, that evidence did not have the “prima facie” effect specified by the statute and defendant was not entitled to the charge she sought.

…It should not be thought, however, that the BAC thresholds specified in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(A) must be entirely omitted from a jury charge in a common law DWI case or in a driving while ability impaired (DWAI) case brought under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (1) (“No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol”). It is obvious from Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 (2) and 1195 (2) that the Legislature has made judgments about the significance of certain statistical thresholds — i.e., that a BAC of .08% or more justifies an inference of intoxication; that a BAC below .08% justifies an inference of non-intoxication; that a BAC above .07% justifies an inference of impairment; and that a BAC equal to or less than .05% justifies an inference that the driver was neither intoxicated nor impaired in her ability to drive. There is no reason why juries should remain unaware of these legislative judgments.

Thus, in this case Town Court should, if it had been requested to do so, have charged the jury in words or substance: If you find that there was less than .08 of one percent by weight of alcohol in defendant's blood while she was operating the motor vehicle, you may, but are not required to, find that she was not in an intoxicated condition. Similarly, in a DWAI case where the defendant proffers evidence other than chemical tests of a BAC at or below .05%, it would be proper to charge: If you find that there was .05 of one percent or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood while she was operating a motor vehicle, you may, but are not required to, find that her ability to operate the motor vehicle was not impaired by the consumption of alcohol. And the People are entitled to a corresponding charge when they rely on evidence other than chemical tests to show that a defendant's BAC was above .08% in a DWI case, or above .07% in a DWAI case.  People v Fratangelo, 2014 NY Slip Op 04041, CtApp 6-5-14

 

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