You are here: / / Workers’ Compensation Carrier Which Consents to Settlement of Third...
,

Workers’ Compensation Carrier Which Consents to Settlement of Third Party Action Is Entitled to Exercise Its Credit Against the Settlement-Recovery Upon Its Consent

The Third Department determined, where the workers’ compensation carrier has consented to claimant’s settlement in a third-party action, the carrier is entitled to exercise its credit against the recovery when the consent is given:

When a workers’ compensation carrier consents to the settlement of a claimant’s third-party action, the carrier shall have a lien on the proceeds of the recovery equal to the amount of benefits already paid, and may also assert the right to offset future compensation benefits paid until the proceeds of the recovery are exhausted (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [1], [4]…). The issue before us again on this appeal is the point at which a carrier is entitled to exercise its credit. As we observed previously in this matter, “there is no reference in the statute as to when the credit shall commence” (104 AD3d at 1014; see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [4]). Cognizant of the fact that the statute in question was enacted in substantial part to prevent a claimant from receiving a double recovery …, we agree with the carrier that its right to exercise its credit must be available, if provided for in the consent letter, at the point at which the carrier provides its consent. To hold otherwise would result in payments made by the carrier that are not subject to either lien or credit rights, i.e., those payments made between the date of consent — at which point the amount of the carrier’s lien is fixed — and the date of actual settlement. This resulting double payment to the claimant would be contrary to the intent of the statute.  Matter of Williams v Lloyd Gunther El Serv Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 03740, 3rd Dept 5-22-14

 

You might also like
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE INFORMED WIFE OF HER RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR SHE WAS HAVING TROUBLE RETAINING AN ATTORNEY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
REPORT BY CONSULTANT IN THIS BILLING DISPUTE NOT PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT, ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT OR MATERIAL-PREPARED-FOR-LITIGATION PRIVILEGES, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
THE PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE EXCEEDED THAT ALLOWED BY THE MOLINEUX RULING, DEFENDANT’S MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSED THE MERITS OF THE ACTION WITHOUT DISCOVERY AND TRIAL; THE COURT SHOULD ONLY HAVE DECIDED WHETHER PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MATTER REMITTED FOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE (THIRD DEPT).
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SERVICE OF PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 307 IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND THE FAILURE TO MAKE DILIGENT EFFORTS TO COMPLY WARRANTED DENIAL OF A MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR SERVICE PURSUANT TO BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 306-b (THIRD DEPT).
THE DE BOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP REQUIREMENTS, APPLY TO THE APPROACH OF A PERSON IN A STATIONARY CAR WITH THE ENGINE RUNNING (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE PETITIONER, COUNTY COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES, WAS PROPERLY TERMINATED FROM HER EMPLOYMENT FOR OTHER REASONS, THE FACT THAT SHE TESTIFIED IN FAMILY COURT ABOUT THE PROPER PLACEMENT OF A JUVENILE WHICH WAS NOT AS SEVERE AS THE PLACEMENT ADVOCATED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF LOYALTY (THIRD DEPT).
Summary Judgment Finding Derivative Neglect Should Not Have Been Granted

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Professional Photographer Deemed Employee of New York Post English Judgment Enforceable by New York Courts Without Demonstration of Subject...