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Security Guard and College Had No Duty to Protect Taxi Driver from Attack by Students on Campus—Plaintiff Was Not a Third Party Beneficiary of Contract Between Security Company and College

The Second Department determined defendants security company (Secuitas), security guard (Jarrett) and college (Manhattanville) did not owe any duty to a taxi driver who was allegedly attacked and injured by students on a college campus.  The complaint alleged a security guard (Jarrett) was nearby and did nothing to intervene in the attack:

A contractual obligation, standing alone, generally will not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party … . Before an injured party may recover as a third-party beneficiary for failure to perform a duty imposed by contract, it must clearly appear from the provisions of the contract that the parties thereto intended to confer a direct benefit on the alleged third-party beneficiary to protect him or her from physical injury … .

The plaintiff here was not a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Securitas and Manhattanville, as the contract did not contain any express provision that it would protect individuals on the campus from physical injury or attack … . Securitas and Jarrett did not assume a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the plaintiff by virtue of its contractual duty to provide an unarmed security guard … . Securitas did not assume a duty pursuant to the contract to prevent assaults, or to protect the plaintiff from physical injury inflicted by intervening third-party assailants … . As such, Securitas and Jarrett established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Ramirez v Genovese, 2014 NY Slip Op 03673, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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