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Medical Malpractice, Negligence

Question of Fact About Whether Order Given by Private Attending Physician and Carried Out by Hospital Employee Was Contraindicated—Therefore Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss Properly Denied

The Second Department noted that a hospital generally may not be held liable for the actions of a private attending physician (Simoncic) where the hospital employees merely carry out the orders of the private physician.  Here, however, there was evidence the attending physician’s order was contraindicated.  Therefore the hospital’s motion to dismiss was properly denied:

With regard to the Hospital’s potential liability, a hospital may not be held liable for injuries suffered by a patient who is under the care of a private attending physician chosen by the patient where the resident physicians and nurses employed by the hospital merely carry out the orders of the private attending physician, unless the hospital staff commits “independent acts of negligence or the attending physician’s orders are contraindicated by normal practice” (Cerny v Williams, 32 AD3d 881, 883; see Cham v St. Mary’s Hosp. of Brooklyn, 72 AD3d 1003, 1004).

Here, the Hospital established, prima facie, that Simoncic was a private attending physician, and that its employees did not commit independent acts of negligence and that Simoncic’s discharge order that [the patient] be given a prescription for Levaquin was not contraindicated by normal practice. However, in opposition, the plaintiff, through her opposing medical expert’s affirmation, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the prescribing of Levaquin was contraindicated by normal practice … .

Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. Fink v DeAngelis, 2014 NY Slip Op 03648, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

May 21, 2014
Tags: Second Department
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