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Waiver and Release Signed by Plaintiff When She Rented a Segway Vehicle Precluded Her Personal Injury Action Even Though the Accident Occurred During a Tour Conducted by Defendant’s Employees

The Second Department determined the waiver and release signed by plaintiff when she rented a Segway vehicle precluded  her personal injury action.  Plaintiff was taking a tour in the vehicle which was conducted by defendant’s employees.  The vehicle became stuck in mud causing plaintiff to fall:

“Absent a statute or public policy to the contrary, a contractual provision absolving a party from its own negligence will be enforced” … . Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing the waiver and release signed by the plaintiff … . Further, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, General Obligations Law § 5-326 does not invalidate the release because the fee she paid to the defendant was for the rental of the Segway vehicle, and was not an admission fee for the use of the public trail over which the tour was conducted … .  Deutsch v Woodridge Segway LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 03475, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

 

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UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW A CONTRACT WITH MUTUAL CANCELLATION CLAUSES IS VALID; THEREFORE THE CANCELLATION BY DEFENDANT WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OR THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH (SECOND DEPT).
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