You are here: / / Equitable Subrogation in the Context of Funds from One Mortgage Loan Used...

Equitable Subrogation in the Context of Funds from One Mortgage Loan Used to Pay Off Another Explained

The Second Department explained the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Plaintiff had given two valid mortgages to one bank, and another bank subsequently used a portion of the proceeds of its loan to satisfy those mortgages:

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, where the “property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the property of another, under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder” … . Harris v Thompson, 2014 NY Slip Op 03487, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

 

You might also like
Prejudice to County Investigation Stemming from Plaintiff’s Describing the Wrong Location of the Slip and Fall in the Notice of Claim Precluded Plaintiff from Amending the Notice
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS INVOLVED IN A COLLISION WHICH PUSHED HIS CAR INTO DEFENDANT’S CAR WHICH WAS PARKED ALONG THE CURB IN VIOLATION OF PARKING REGULATIONS; THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT ASKED PLAINTIFF TO WIRE THE LOAN PROCEEDS TO A BANK IN NEW YORK; NEW YORK THEREFORE HAD JURISDICTION, PURSUANT TO CPLR 302, OVER THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPAY THE LOAN (SECOND DEPT).
CLAIMANT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) and 241(6) ACTION AGAINST THE STATE SERVED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WITH THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE A CLAIM BUT NOT THE NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY (NYSTA); ALTHOUGH THE EXCUSE (IGNORANCE OF THE LAW) WAS NOT VALID, THE ACTION HAD MERIT AND THE NYSTA HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS; THEREFORE CLAIMANT’S MOTION TO SERVE AND FILE A LATE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Fall After Coverage Ceased Not Covered, Even though Dangerous Condition Alleged to Have Existed Before Termination of Coverage
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INDICATED SHE DID NOT KNOW THE CAUSE OF HER FALL IN HER DEPOSITION, IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE FLOOR WAS WET FROM TRACKED IN SNOW AND DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SUPERVISED AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Releases Effectively Prohibiting Decedent’s Exercise of a Power of Appointment... Codefendant’s Statement Was Admissible—the Fact that the Statement...