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Unauthorized Use of Another’s Credit Card Number Is Not Identity Theft Where the Card Owner’s Identity Is Not Otherwise Assumed/Unauthorized Use of Another’s Credit Card Number Can Constitute Possession of Stolen Property

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined: (1) the use of another’s credit card number does not constitute identity theft unless the person using the number assumes the other’s identity; and (3) the use of another’s credit card number constitutes possession of stolen property: THIS CASE HAS BEEN REVERSED

This appeal raises questions about the elements of identity theft and whether intangible property can be criminally possessed, where a defendant used his associate’s credit card number to pay for hotel expenses without authorization. Specifically, we are called upon to determine, first, whether assumption of identity is a discrete element of identity theft or whether it occurs automatically when a person uses another’s personal identifying information, and second, whether criminal possession of stolen property includes intangible property, namely a credit card number. Regarding the first issue, we find that to secure a conviction for identity theft the People must prove not only that a defendant used another’s personal identifying information, but that he or she consequently assumed the identity of that person. Because the hotel was aware of defendant’s identity, he did not assume the identity of his associate by charging the credit card and, accordingly, the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of identity theft. As to the second issue, we have determined that the legislature intended intangibles, including credit card numbers, to fall within the ambit of criminal possession of stolen property. Defendant constructively possessed his associate’s stolen credit card number, and thus he was properly convicted of the latter offense. People v Barden, 2014 NY Slip Op 02527, 1st Dept 4-10-14

 

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