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Action for Attorney Deceit Originated in New York Common Law, Not Statutory Law—Six-Year “Catch All” Statute of Limitations Applies

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion Judge Read, determined that an action for attorney deceit (Judiciary Law 487) was governed by the six-year “catch-all” statute of limitations (CPLR 213(1)), not the three-year statute (CPLR 214(2)). The question came down to whether the attorney-deceit action stemmed from a statute or from the common law. The Court noted that the statutory law of England was incorporated into New York’s common law before the first New York statute dealing with attorney deceit was was enacted.  Therefore the “catch-all” six-year statute applied:

A cause of action for attorney deceit … existed as part of New York’s common law before the first New York statute governing attorney deceit was enacted in 1787 … . The 1787 statute enhanced the penalties for attorney deceit by adding an award for treble damages, but did not create the cause of action … .Thus, even if a claim for attorney deceit originated in the first Statute of Westminster rather than preexisting English common law …, liability for attorney deceit existed at New York common law prior to 1787. As a result, claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1). Melcher v Greenberg Traurig LLP, 2014 NY Slip Op 02213, CtApp 4-1-14

 

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