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Uninhabited Trailer Met Definition of a “Building” Within the Meaning of the Arson Statute

The Fourth Department determined that a trailer that periodically was used as lodging, although not so used at the time of the fire, constituted a “building” within the meaning of the arson statute:

“The ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘building’ has been alternatively defined as ‘a constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently, covering a space of land, usu[ally] covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling’ . . . , ‘a structure with a roof and walls’ . . . and ‘[a] structure or edifice inclosing a space within its walls and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof’ . . . The term generally, though not always, implies the idea of a habitat for a person’s permanent use or an erection connected with his or her permanent use” … .

Inasmuch as the trailer herein was “a constructed edifice enclosed by walls, covered by a roof, designed to stand permanently, and serving a useful purpose, it is included within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘building’ ” … . …In addition to furnishings for sleeping, the trailer had a bathroom and a kitchen. Moreover, the trailer was equipped with a power cord for immediate access to power and a propane tank that could be used to power the refrigerator and heaters. At the time of the arson, the trailer was being used to secure the owners’ property while they were remodeling the inside of their house. In any event, with respect to the trailer’s character as a building in the ordinary sense of the word, it is of no moment that no one was actually residing in the trailer on the day of the incident … .

Even assuming, arguendo, that the trailer did not fit within the ordinary meaning of the term, we conclude that it constituted a building under the secondary definition of building contained in the statute, i.e., a “structure . . . used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein” (Penal Law § 150.00 [1]). Defendant recognized that the trailer was used for overnight lodging “on ‘vacations’ or weekend retreats,” and it is undisputed that defendant had previously rented the trailer as overnight lodging for a period of four months. Although no one was residing in the trailer on the day of the fire, we likewise conclude that such fact does not alter the essential character of the structure as one used for overnight lodging. People v Norcutt, 195, 4th Dept 3-28-14

 

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