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Involuntary Mental Health Patient Should Not Have Been Released Pursuant to a Habeas Corpus Petition Without an “Examination Into the Patient’s Alleged Disability and Detention,” Despite the Hospital’s Untimely Request for Continued Detention (in Violation of the Mental Hygiene Law)/Appellate Court’s Ability to Hear a Moot Case Explained (Mootness Doctrine)

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined that immediate release of an involuntaty patient from a mental health hospital pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus because of the facility’s failure to comply with the Mental Hygiene Law provisions for continued detention was reversible error.  Supreme Court should have conducted an examination into the patient’s alleged disability and detention.  The court discussed the nature and origin of the habeas corpus petition and the relationship between a habeas corpus petition brought under the Mental Hygiene Law and under Article 70 of the CPLR (finding them to be in essence the same). In addition, the Second Department discussed the mootness doctrine which, under certain circumtances, allows an appellate court to hear  a moot case.  The habeas corpus petition here had been rendered moot by the patient’s release:

Generally, courts are precluded “from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time or change in circumstances” …. . Typically, “an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment” … . However, an exception to the mootness doctrine permits a court to review a case if the controversy or issue involved is likely to recur, typically evades review, and raises a substantial and novel question … .Here, the release of the patient renders this appeal academic. We nevertheless exercise our discretion to review the issues raised on this appeal pursuant to the exception to the mootness doctrine because the primary issue raised is an important one which implicates both the patient’s fundamental liberty interest and the State’s interest in protecting the mentally ill, and is one which is likely to recur. Further, the primary issue involved here may typically evade review because “[t]he Mental Hygiene Law contemplates that involuntary hospitalization in a mental health facility is often brief and temporary . . . [and the law] require[s] frequent periodic review of a patient’s status, and the release of the patient unless OMH is granted successive court orders authorizing retention” … . * * *

Here, the patient was initially involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9 due to his alleged mental illness and, thereafter, the petition for a writ was filed on the patient’s behalf. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to determine whether the patient was being unlawfully detained (see CPLR 7002[a]… ). Therefore, in order to determine the cause and legality of the patient’s detention, the Supreme Court was required to examine the facts of the patient’s alleged mental disability and detention (see Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15[a], [b]; CPLR 7002). The Supreme Court’s failure to conduct the required examination constitutes reversible error. We note that the Hospital supported its untimely retention application with, inter alia, two certificates from the patient’s treating physicians. In those certificates, the physicians asserted that the patient was paranoid, unable to care for himself, and psychotic. Our determination should not be construed as an approval of the Hospital’s dilatory conduct in filing the retention application. There is no dispute that the Hospital failed to comply with Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33. Under the circumstances presented, however, the remedy for such noncompliance is not the immediate release of a patient. We also caution that our reasoning should not be construed to authorize an unlimited violation of article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law so as to allow a patient to be involuntarily retained, without a hearing, indefinitely. People v Munsey, 2014 NY Slip Op 01782, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

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