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Question of Fact Whether Deed Procured by Fraud and Whether Mortgagee Had Notice of the Potential Fraud

The Second Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether a property transfer was procured by fraud.  If so, the deed and the related mortgage would be void with respect to the mortgagee/incumbrancer (Wells Fargo).  There was evidence the mortgagee was on notice about the possible fraud and there was evidence of fraud in the factum:

Real Property Law § 266 protects the “title of a purchaser or incumbrancer for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that he [or she] had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his [or her] immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.” Thus, a mortgagee is not protected in its title if it had previous notice of potential fraud by the immediate seller, or knowledge of facts which put it on inquiry notice as to the existence of a right in potential conflict with its own … . A mortgagee has a duty to inquire when it is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable, prudent lender to inquire into the circumstances of the transaction at issue … . A mortgagee who fails to make such an inquiry is not a bona fide incumbrancer for value … . Here, Wells Fargo’s submissions contain information regarding the plaintiff’s possession of the property that put it on inquiry notice as to the plaintiff’s potential right to the property … . Thus, Wells Fargo failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether it lacked notice of a potential fraud … . Real Property Law § 266 also does not protect a bona fide incumbrancer for value where there has been fraud in the factum, as the deed is void and conveys no title … . Such a conveyance conveys nothing, and a subsequent bona fide incumbrancer for value receives nothing … . Here, Wells Fargo failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether the subject deeds are void ab initio on the ground of fraud in the factum … . Williams v Mentore, 2014 NY Slip Op 01449, 2nd Dept 3-5-14

 

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