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Plaintiff Estopped from Bringing State Retaliation Claim/Issue Decided by District Court Which Dismissed Plaintiff’s Federal Title VII Constructive Discharge Claim

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, the First Department determined plaintiff was estopped from bringing her retaliation action in state court because the issue raised had necessarily been determined when the District Court dismissed her federal complaint. The plaintiff alleged she was retaliated against after she told management about allegedly discriminatory practices. The retaliation was alleged to have been the failure to act quickly to address a dispute with a coworker:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where “[f]irst, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue . . . had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” … . “The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues in the present litigation and the prior determination, whereas the party attempting to defeat its application has the burden of establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action” (id. at 456).In considering plaintiff’s Title VII constructive discharge claim, the District Court examined, as it was obliged to do, the question of whether defendant “intentionally subjected her to an intolerable work environment”… . An integral part …of the court’s determination that defendant had not done so was its explicit finding that defendant “responded promptly after [p]laintiff’s complaint” and “the next day … attempted to address [p]laintiff’s concerns within the constraints of [defendant’s] staffing situation”… . Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, 2014 NY Slip Op 01407, 1st Dept 2-27-14

 

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