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A “Statutory Resident” of New York for Income Tax Purposes Must Actually Reside In New York, Not Merely Maintain Property in New York

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, the Court of Appeals determined that the residency requirement in the income tax law means the taxpayer must actually reside in the dwelling, not merely maintain it. Here the Tax Tribunal determined the petitioner, who had a business in New York to which he traveled from New Jersey each day, and who owned and maintained an apartment house in New York where his elderly parents lived, was not a “statutory resident” of New York within the meaning of the Tax Law:

The Tax Tribunal has interpreted “maintains a permanent place of abode” to mean that a taxpayer need not “reside” in the dwelling, but only maintain it, to qualify as “statutory resident” under Tax Law § 605 [b][1][B]. Our review is limited to whether that interpretation comports with the meaning and intent of the statutes involved … . We conclude there is no rational basis for that interpretation. Notably, nowhere in the statute does it provide anything other than the “permanent place of abode” must relate to the taxpayer. The legislative history of the statute, to prevent tax evasion by New York residents, as well as the regulations, support the view that in order for a taxpayer to have maintained a permanent place of abode in New York, the taxpayer must, himself, have a residential interest in the property. Matter of Gaied v New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, 26, CtApp 2-18-14

 

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