New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Appeals2 / Whether an Element of a Crime Has Been Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt...
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

Whether an Element of a Crime Has Been Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Can Now Be Determined in a “Weight of the Evidence” Review/Such a Determination Is a Matter of Law Identical to a Determination the Evidence Is Legally Insufficient/After Making Such a “Legal” “Weight of the Evidence” Determination, the Court Is Not Constrained to Dismiss the Indictment As It Is When It Makes a “Factual” Determination a Conviction Is Not Supported by the Weight of the Evidence

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scudder, with concurring and dissenting opinions, the Fourth Department reduced defendant’s conviction from murder to manslaughter after applying a “weight of the evidence” analysis. The court explained it is now well-settled that a “weight of the evidence” review may consider whether the elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the court determined there was insufficient evidence of an intent to kill. The stab wounds were inflicted in an attempt to escape the victim’s grasp during an altercation started by the victim. Even though the evidence was analyzed under a “weight of the evidence” review, the court actually concluded the evidence of intent to kill was insufficient as a matter of law. Because a question of law was determinative, the court held that it had the power to reduce the conviction, rather than dismiss the indictment (dismissal of the indictment is the statutory remedy for a “factual” “against the weight of the evidence” finding):

…[I]t is now well established that, “in conducting its weight of the evidence review, a court must consider the elements of the crime, for even if the prosecution’s witnesses were credible their testimony must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349). Upon our review of the elements of the crime of murder in the second degree, we conclude that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the People, “a jury could [not] logically conclude that the People sustained [their] burden of proof” with respect to the element of intent to kill … . * * *

We therefore conclude that, despite the fact that our review is in the context of a contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, our assessment of the elements of the crime of murder in the second degree under these circumstances is not a determination on the facts (see CPL 470.15 [5]), i.e., a consideration of the “credible evidence, conflicting testimony and inferences that could be drawn from the evidence” (Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349). Instead, our assessment is a determination on the law that the evidence is legally insufficient with respect to the element of intent (see CPL 470.15 [4] [b]).

We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague’s conclusion that our review is limited by defendant’s “request for only a weight-based review” and that, based on that request, we must reverse the judgment as against the weight of the evidence and dismiss the indictment. Our conclusion that the judgment should be modified by reducing the conviction to a lesser included offense is supported by our reasoning that a defendant may not usurp our authority to determine the appropriate statutory remedy as set forth in CPL 470.20 by the manner in which he or she challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., within the context of a weight of the evidence contention rather than by an express contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). In other words, we conclude that we are not required to afford the remedy of dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 470.20 (5) merely because defendant’s contention that the evidence of the intent to kill was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt is made in the context of a request for a weight of the evidence review, rather than in the context of a contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, even if that contention is not preserved for our review. People v Heatley, 1051, 4th Dept 2-14-14

 

February 14, 2014
Tags: APPEALS, Fourth Department, LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 CurlyHost https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png CurlyHost2014-02-14 00:00:002020-09-08 13:47:00Whether an Element of a Crime Has Been Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Can Now Be Determined in a “Weight of the Evidence” Review/Such a Determination Is a Matter of Law Identical to a Determination the Evidence Is Legally Insufficient/After Making Such a “Legal” “Weight of the Evidence” Determination, the Court Is Not Constrained to Dismiss the Indictment As It Is When It Makes a “Factual” Determination a Conviction Is Not Supported by the Weight of the Evidence
You might also like
Cleaning Clogged Drain Was Routine Maintenance, Not Covered by Labor Law 240(1)
RESENTENCING IN SUPREME COURT AFTER CONVICTION IN COUNTY COURT WAS ILLEGAL (FOURTH DEPT).
A COURT CANNOT MANDATE A SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS EXERCISE FOR A CHILD (ORDERING THAT A CHILD ATTEND A SPECIFIC CHURCH FOR EXAMPLE); RATHER, THE COURT SHOULD DESIGNATE A PARENT TO HAVE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER A CHILD’S RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND EXCERCISE (FOURTH DEPT).
AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
INADEQUATE INQUIRY PRECEDING FATHER’S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL.
Defendant’s Actions In Driving Under the Influence and Causing a Collision Did Not Support Convictions for Offenses Requiring Proof of a Depraved Indifference to Human Life
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY VALIDATED 25 SIGNATURES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO RUN IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).
WAIVER OF APPEAL OF THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPEAL OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR A SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF PROBATION; SENTENCE DEEMED HARSH AND EXCESSIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

“Vested Right” Doctrine Explained County Could Not Shift Obligation to Pay Property Tax Refunds to Taxing Dis...
Scroll to top