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Fall from Subway Platform Not the Result of Negligent Crowd Control

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and dismissed a lawsuit stemming from plaintiff’s decedent’s fall from a subway platform to the tracks below. The court explained the negligence criteria with respect to the crowd on a subway platform:

“A subway company is not negligent merely because it permits crowds to gather on its platform. Before proof of negligence in this regard may be said to exist, it must be shown that the crowd was so large and unmanaged that a user of the platform was restricted in his free movements or was unable to find a safe standing place, and that as a result of either of those conditions an injury was sustained” … .Here, there is no evidence that the crowd on the subway platform was so large and unmanaged that it restricted the decedent’s freedom of movement to the extent necessary to impose liability on the Transit Authority. The evidence in the record was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the Transit Authority and, in effect, was insufficient to establish that any negligence was a proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries… . Garcia v New York Tr Auth, 2014 NY Slip Op 00961, 2nd Dept 2-13-14

 

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