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Vehicle Owner’s Uncontradicted Deposition Testimony Not Enough to Overcome Presumption Vehicle Driven with Owner’s Consent

The Second Department determined that the defendant vehicle owner (Witsell) did not overcome the presumption her vehicle was being driven with her consent:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) “makes every owner of a vehicle liable for injuries resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle . . . by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner’”… .. Under this statute, there is a presumption that the operator of a vehicle operates it with the owner’s permission … . The presumption may be rebutted by substantial evidence that the owner did not give the operator consent …

Here, Witsell failed to establish her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. … “The uncontradicted testimony of a vehicle owner that the vehicle was operated without his or her permission, does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use” … . Since Witsell failed to meet her initial burden as the movant, the burden never shifted to the party opposing the motion to raise a triable issue of fact… . Ellis v Witsell, 2014 NY Slip Op 00630, 2nd Dept 2-5-14

 

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