Level Three Forcible Stop Not Justified, Convictions Reversed—Prior Arrest of One of the Defendants and the Fact that Both Defendants Were Running While Looking Back Over their Shoulders Was Not Enough to Justify the Forcible Stop
In a two separate full-fledged opinions by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, over dissents, the First Department reversed defendants’ convictions, finding that their motions to suppress should have been granted. Defendants were stopped after the police observed them running at 4:40 am. Both men, Thomas and Brown, were looking back over their shoulders as they ran. Brown (but not Thomas) was known to the police as someone who “engaged in fraudulent accosting in that area…”. The First Department determined the stop was not justified for either defendant:
A level three forcible stop is constitutional only if the police have a “reasonable suspicion that a particular person was involved in a felony or misdemeanor” … . In determining whether the police officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion, only the information known to the officers prior to the forcible stop is relevant … .
The officers’ knowledge of defendant Brown’s prior criminality in the same neighborhood was not sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a level three intrusion as to Brown; perforce, knowledge of Brown’s prior criminality was insufficient to justify a level three intrusion as to [Thomas], who was merely in Brown’s company and was not even known by the officers to have a criminal record. The police sergeant only knew [Thomas] by face, and the officer did not know [Thomas] personally and had never arrested him. … The motion court, in denying [Thomas’] motion to suppress, appears to have endorsed a theory of “guilt by association,” which must vigorously be rejected.
“[A] stop based on no more than that a suspect has previously been arrested . . . is premature and unlawful and cannot be justified by subsequently acquired information resulting from the stop”… . * * *
The fact that the officers observed [Thomas] and Brown running does not elevate the level of suspicion. Flight, accompanied by equivocal circumstances, does not supply the requisite reasonable suspicion … . The police did not observe conduct indicative of criminality, nor did they even possess information that a crime had occurred in the area. People v Thomas, 2014 NY Slip Op 00291, 1st Dept 1-16-14; same result in People v Brown, 2014 NY Slip Op 00292, 1st Dept 1-16-14