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Dismissal for Failure to Show Up at a Conference with the Judge Constituted a Dismissal for Neglect to Prosecute within the Meaning of CPLR 205/2008 Amendment to CPLR 205 Did Not Apply Retroactively

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, the Second Department determined the plaintiffs could not recommence a lawsuit which was dismissed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 when the plaintiffs failed to show up at a conference with the judge. CPLR 205 precludes the recommencement of a lawsuit dismissed for neglect to prosecute. In 2008 CPLR 205 was amended to require the judge to put on the record the specific conduct constituting neglect and to specify that the conduct involved a general pattern of delay.  In order for the plaintiffs to prevail in their attempt to restart the suit, the 2008 amendment would have to be deemed to apply retroactively.  The Second Department determined that the dismissal for failure to show up at the conference was a dismissal for neglect to prosecute, and the 2008 amendment did not apply retroactively. Therefore the plaintiffs attempt to restart the suit failed:

…[W]e conclude that the prior action commenced by the plaintiffs was dismissed for failure to prosecute. We further conclude that the 2008 amendment to CPLR 205(a) is not to be applied retroactively and, thus, the plaintiffs may not avail themselves of the saving provision of CPLR 205(a) regardless of whether the Supreme Court set forth in the record the specific conduct constituting the plaintiffs’ neglect to prosecute or evidence that the plaintiffs were engaged in a general pattern of delay. Marrero v Nails, 2013 NY Slip Op 08599, 2nd Dept 12-26-13

 

 

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