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Court Erred In Applying the “15% Increase in Income” Criteria for Support Modification to an Order Which Predated the 2010 Effective Date of the “15% Increase” Statutory Amendment/the 2008 Order Was Incorporated But Not Merged Into a 2012 Judgment

The Third Department determined Family Court erred in modifying child support based upon the father’s income having increased by 15%.  The 2008 child support order at issue pre-dated the 2010 effective date of the “15% increase” statutory amendment and the order was not merged with the 2012 judgment of divorce:

Family Court erred in finding that child support should be modified based on a 15% change in the father’s income.  Family Ct Act § 451 (2) (b) (ii) allows a court to modify an order of child support, without requiring a party to allege or demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances, where either party’s gross income has changed by 15% or more since the order was entered or modified.  When that provision was added to the statute through a 2010 amendment, however, the Legislature provided that “if the child support order incorporated without merging a valid agreement or stipulation of the parties, the amendments [to section 451] shall only apply if the incorporated agreement or stipulation was executed on or after [October 13, 2010]” (L 2010, ch 182, § 13).  The 2008 order was based upon the parties’ agreement, incorporated into the 2012 judgment of divorce and entered prior to the effective date of the statute’s 2010 amendments.  Accordingly, the amendments did not apply to a modification of this order, and Family Court should not have relied on the father’s 15% increase in income as the basis for modification.

For agreements executed prior to the effective date of the amendments to Family Ct Act § 451, the standard for modifying an order based on the parties’ agreement is whether the petitioning party has demonstrated “an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances” or that the children’s needs are not being met … .  The mother’s generalized testimony that the costs of food, health care and clothing for the children had increased, as had the father’s income, was insufficient to meet her burden under that standard … .  Matter of Zibell v Zibell, 516324, 3rd Dept 12-12-13

 

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