You are here: / / “Home or Business Exception” to Criminal Possession of a Weapon Does Not...

“Home or Business Exception” to Criminal Possession of a Weapon Does Not Apply to Defendant Previously Convicted of a Crime

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals determined the “home or business exception” to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree did not apply when the defendant has been previously been convicted of any crime:

…[T]his appeal requires us to interpret the “home or business” exception to the third-degree weapon possession statute, Penal Law § 265.03 (3).  Under that statute:

“A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when:” (3) such person possesses any loaded firearm.  Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision one . . . of section 265.02 of this article, constitute a violation of this subdivision if such possession takes place in such person’s home or place of business.”

Section 265.02 (1), to which the above quoted language refers, defines criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.  Under Penal Law § 265.02 (1), a person is guilty of third degree criminal possession when he or she “commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree . . . and has been previously convicted of any crime.”  The Appellate Division read the reference in section 265.03 (3) to section 265.02 (1) as creating an exception to the home or business exception — i.e., to make that exception inapplicable when the defendant has a previous criminal conviction.  We agree with this reading of the statute.  People v Jones, 185, CtApp 11-19-13

 

You might also like
“Outing” Confidential Informant Online Constituted Witness Tampering
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ARGUMENT NOT PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.
THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NYC PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST BLACK AND LATINO STUDENTS FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW (CT APP). ​
ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING IS OWNED BY A NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH RAISES FUNDS FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES, THE BUILDING IS LEASED TO A FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH PROVIDES DIALYSIS; THE LEASED BUILDING, THEREFORE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAX PURSUANT TO RPTL 420-A (CT APP).
DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ASSERT THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, DEFENDANT INSISTED HE WAS NOT THE SHOOTER AND INSTRUCTED COUNSEL NOT TO RAISE JUSTIFICATION AS A DEFENSE.
DEFENDANT, WHO ACCEPTED POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON FROM HIS FRIEND, DID SO IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION; DURING THE CONFRONTATION DEFENDANT SHOT TWO PEOPLE; THE ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE DID NOT RENDER DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON TEMPORARY AND LAWFUL (CT APP).
NASSAU COUNTY PROPERLY DETERMINED A POLICE OFFICER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL DAMAGES STEMMING FROM A LAWSUIT BY AN ARRESTEE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN JAIL AFTER THE OFFICER KNEW HE COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME (CT APP)
Legal Criteria for Determining Visitation Rights of Incarcerated Father Clarified

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Defendant Who Was Not Informed His Guilty Plea Would Result in Deportation Was... Statute Which Elevates Criminal Possession of a Weapon to a C Felony, Even When...