You are here: / / Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment Against Third-Party Defendant Under...

Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment Against Third-Party Defendant Under Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment against a third-party defendant under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Plaintiff was injured in a snowmobile collision.  Plaintiff sued one snowmobile driver and the other snowmobile driver was brought into the case as a third-party defendant. The jury found each driver 50% liable:

…[W]e agree that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in the amount sought in the complaint based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  We therefore modify the order accordingly.  “The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating ‘an issue which has previously been decided against him in a proceeding in which he had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point’ ” … .  “The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of demonstrating the identity of the issues in the present litigation and the prior determination, whereas the party attempting to defeat its application has the burden of establishing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action” … .  Here, the issues are identical because in the prior action defendant was required to defend against the claim that he was negligent in the operation of his snowmobile and that his negligence was a proximate cause of this accident.  Moreover, he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues in the prior action and was in no way limited by virtue of the fact that he was a third-party defendant as opposed to a direct defendant.  Specifically, CPLR 1008 grants to a third-party defendant all of the rights a direct defendant has to defend against a plaintiff’s claims, including the full rights of discovery afforded by CPLR article 31… .  Given that defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the negligence claim against him in the prior action as well as to contest the value of plaintiff’s injuries, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment… . Ackman v Haberer, 1059, 4th Dept 11-15-13

 

You might also like
THE PEOPLE WERE NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHEMICAL BREATH TEST SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED; NEW SUPPRESSION HEARING ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
Court Review of Sufficiency of Evidence Before a Grand Jury Explained
A ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION ABSENT AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OR OTHER DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH ENFORCING THE ZONING CODE (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT DURING THE PLEA ALLOCUTION RAISED A VIABLE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH REQUIRED FURTHER INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE, ERROR IS A RARE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT WAS BASED UPON AN ANONYMOUS TIP, SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).
People Failed to Prove Low IQ Defendant Validly Waived His Miranda Rights and Gave Statements Voluntarily—Convictions Reversed, Some Charges Dismissed and New Trial Ordered
VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT).
MOLINEUX EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR BURGLARY OF THE ROBBERY-VICTIM’S HOME TO SHOW THE INTENT TO COMMIT ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE INTENT TO COMMIT ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY RENDERING EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR BURGLARY TOO PREJUDICIAL (FOURTH DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Relation-Back Doctrine Allowed Amendment of Complaint After S/L Had Run County Properly Passed Legislation Phasing Out Tax Exemption