You are here: / / Statutory 9% Interest Rate, Not Contractual 18% Rate, Should Have Been...
,

Statutory 9% Interest Rate, Not Contractual 18% Rate, Should Have Been Applied to Breach of Contract Damages (Even Though the Monthly Payments Were Deposited in an Escrow Account During Litigation)

The Second Department determined plaintiff should have been awarded prejudgment interest on the principal amount of the damages awarded for breach of contract at the statutory 9% rate, not the contractual 18% rate which was included in the agreed monthly installment payments:

…CPLR 5001(a) mandates an award of prejudgment interest on the principal amount of the damages awarded for its breach of contract even though the monthly payments due were deposited in an escrow account during the pendency of this action, and [defendant] received no benefit from the disputed payments while they were held in escrow … . However, the Surrogate’s Court improperly applied interest on the monthly payments due at the rate of 18% per annum. “When a claim is predicated on a breach of contract, the applicable rate of prejudgment interest varies depending on the nature and terms of the contract” … . The contract rate of interest will be “used to calculate interest on principal prior to loan maturity or a default in performance,” and in the absence of “a provision in the contract addressing the interest rate that governs after principal is due or in the event of a breach, New York’s statutory rate will be applied as the default rate” … . Under the terms of the agreement at issue here, each monthly payment includes interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Since the contract rate has already been applied to each monthly payment prior to its maturity, and the agreement does not include a provision addressing the interest rate that governs after each monthly payment is due or in the event of a breach, the Surrogate’s Court should have applied interest upon each monthly payment from the date it became due at the statutory rate of 9% per annum (see CPLR 5004…). Ross v Ross Metals Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 07466, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

You might also like
IT WAS ALLEGED DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS DID NOT INSTRUCT THE DECEDENT TO REVOKE THE TOTTEN TRUSTS SO THE FUNDS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER WISHES AS SET OUT IN THE WILL AND TRUST DRAFTED BY DEFENDANTS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION RELIED ON BUSINESS RECORDS DESCRIBED IN AN AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF; BUT THE AFFIANT DID NOT LAY A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF THOSE RECORDS IN EVIDENCE; JUDGMENT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; THE REPORT THAT A SUSPICIOUS CAR WAS FOLLOWING SOMEONE DID NOT DESCRIBE THE CAR AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT FOLLOWING ANYONE WHEN STOPPED; THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS TRESPASSING BY DRIVING ON THE PRIVATE ROAD, WHICH WAS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP RELIED UPON BY SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).
THE PRE-ANSWER, PRE-DISCOVERY MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A DE FACTO MERGER OF TWO CORPORATIONS; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PART PERFORMANCE BY INACTION SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT).
GUARANTOR OF A CRIMINALLY USURIOUS LOAN WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION SEEKING PAYMENT, THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PAIS DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
THE DRAM SHOP ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF THE INTOXICATED PERSON (SECOND DEPT).
CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS IN THE EDUCATION LAW AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW; PLAINTIFF-STUDENT, WHO HAD BEEN BULLIED AND WAS PUSHED TO THE FLOOR BY ANOTHER STUDENT, RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
STATEMENTS ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH THE INSTALLATION OF GAS LINES MADE BY DEFENDANT WHO WAS HIRED TO FIND THE CAUSE OF THE GAS LEAKS PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED COMMON-INTEREST PRIVILEGE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

“Sudden Stopping” and “Emergency Doctrine” Jury Instructions Proper... Consecutive Sentences for Possession of Weapon and the Crime Committed Later...