“At Will” Clause in Employment Contract Precluded Action Based Upon Promissory Estoppel, Fraud and Negligent Representation/Criteria for Tortious Interference With Contract and Prima Facie Tort Not Met

The Third Department affirmed the dismissal of a complaint brought by a doctor against the hospital where he was employed and the doctor who supervised him.  The plaintiff was hired pursuant to an agreement which included an “at will” clause allowing termination without cause upon 60 days notice. Plaintiff was terminated upon 90 days notice. Plaintiff sued the hospital for promissory estoppel, fraud, and negligent representation.  Plaintiff sued his supervisor [Hussain] for tortious interference with contract and prima facie tort:

Plaintiff’s claims against the hospital all required a showing that, among other things, he reasonably relied on any alleged promises or misrepresentations made to him by the hospital … .  In this regard, we note that “[w]here, as here, ‘a plaintiff is offered only at-will employment, he or she will generally be unable to establish reasonable reliance on a prospective employer’s representations'” … . * * * Inasmuch as any oral assurances made by the hospital as to the security of plaintiff’s position could not have altered the at-will nature of the employment contract, the hospital established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the claims against it, shifting the burden to plaintiff “‘to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action’”… . * * *

… [A] claim of tortious interference with contract requires (1) the existence of a valid contract between a plaintiff and a third party, (2) a defendant’s knowledge of such contract, (3) the intentional inducement of a breach of that contract, and (4) damages … .  Significantly, as the contract here was terminable at will, plaintiff was also required to “show that [Hussain] employed wrongful means, such as fraud, misrepresentation or threats[,] to effect the termination of employment”… .No such showing was made here. * * *

“[Prima facie tort] requires a showing of an intentional infliction of harm, without excuse or justification, by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful . . . and that malevolence was the sole motivating factor” … .  Considering plaintiff’s acknowledgment that Hussain prevented him from examining patients as a result of complaints made by patients who wanted to be treated by Hussain and not plaintiff, plaintiff could not establishthat Hussain’s actions were motivated solely by “disinterested malevolence”… . Hobler v Hussain…, 516381, 3rd Dept 11-7-13