You are here: / / In Court Stipulation Was Valid Postnuptial Agreement; DRL 236(B)(3) Did...

In Court Stipulation Was Valid Postnuptial Agreement; DRL 236(B)(3) Did Not Apply

In affirming Supreme Court’s determination that a stipulation/postnuptial agreement, which was not signed in open court, was not invalidated by Domestic Relations Law 236, the Second Department explained:

…[T]he Supreme Court properly determined that the postnuptial agreement was valid and that Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) does not compel a different result. “An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][3]). A written agreement between parties made before or during a marriage which does not meet the formalities of Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) is not enforceable … . However, Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) “applies only to agreements entered into outside the context of a pending judicial proceeding”… . Moreover, “[s]tipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly cast aside” … . Thus, “[a]n agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action, other than one made between counsel in open court, is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney or reduced to the form of an order and entered” (CPLR 2104…).

Here, the record established that the parties relied on the duly executed stipulation of settlement, which was denominated as the postnuptial agreement, as a means of resolving the respondent’s prior divorce action. It is undisputed that the postnuptial agreement was executed while the respondent’s action was pending before the Supreme Court … . … Accordingly, the postnuptial agreement was valid, as it “was executed in the context of a pending divorce proceeding, and was subject to judicial oversight, even though it was not signed in open court” … . Rio v Rio, 1013 NY Slip Op 07023, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

You might also like
Person May Have More that One Residence for Insurance Purposes
SCHOOL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF WATER ON THE FLOOR IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Action for Fraud Cannot Be Based on Same Facts as Breach of Contract; Fraud Must Be Pled in Detail
DEFENDANT PROPERLY REJECTED THE MACHINES AS NONCONFORMING GOODS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT CURE THE NONCONFORMITY, AND DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND LOST PROFITS (SECOND DEPT). ​
Erroneous Discharge of Mortgage Can Be Set Aside Where No Detrimental Reliance
​THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) RELIED SOLELY ON PRIOR NEGLECT FINDINGS FROM 2007 AND 2009 TO PROVE DERIVATIVE NEGLECT; NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR AS OPPOSED TO ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIR CONDITIONER WHEN HE WAS INJURED; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DIMSISS THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMIISED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Administrative Review of a Rent Overcharge Petition Should Have Been Granted;... Abuse Not Demonstrated; Conflicting Expert Testimony