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Denial of For Cause Juror Challenge Required Reversal

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction because the trial court erroneously denied a “for cause” juror challenge:

The court erred in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to a prospective juror who stated his belief and concern that he recognized defendant from his neighborhood, along with his fear that he would “run into” defendant or his friends. After being apprised of defendant’s address, the panelist expressed an increased concern, resulting from the fact that he lived near that address. The panelist also expressed a “feeling of defendant’s guilt,” because he believed the neighborhood was “infected with drugs and drug dealers,” After further inquiry regarding whether the panelist could follow the law and remain impartial, he ultimately stated, “I’ll try. . . . I can’t promise you anything. . . .” Viewing his statements in context and as a whole, they did not amount to an unequivocal assurance of impartiality… .  People v Tavarez, 2013 NY Slip Op 06515, 1st Dept 10-8-13

 

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