You are here: / / Plaintiff Should Have Been Allowed to Voluntarily Discontinue Lawsuit

Plaintiff Should Have Been Allowed to Voluntarily Discontinue Lawsuit

The First Department determined Supreme Court should have permitted plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the lawsuit:

The court erred in declining to permit plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the action. CPLR 3217(b) authorizes a court to grant a motion for voluntary discontinuance “upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper.” While the determination upon such an application is generally within the sound discretion of the court …, a party ordinarily cannot be compelled to litigate and, absent special circumstances, such as prejudice to adverse parties, a discontinuance should be granted … . No special circumstances have been shown here, especially since the action is still in the early stages of litigation. Nor was there any showing that plaintiff sought the discontinuance only to avoid an adverse determination in this action ,,, . Since we are granting plaintiff’s motion, the cross motion to compel discovery must be denied.  Bank of Am NA v Douglas, 2013 NY Slip 06440, 1st Dept 10-3-13

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF, A NEW YORK RESIDENT AND A SHAREHOLDER IN DEFENDANT LONDON CORPORATION, ALLEGED DEFENDANT WRONGFULLY FAILED TO PAY DIVIDENDS; THE LONDON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Plea Colloquy of Co-Defendant Was Inadmissible Hearsay—Court’s Granting of Defendant’s Request to Have the Colloquy Read to the Jury Over Defense Counsel’s Objection Deprived Defendant of His Right To Counsel
UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE HOMEOWNER IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, FENCE AND GATE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL USE OF THE SIDEWALK BY THE HOMEOWNER (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE COULD RECEIVE JAIL TIME IF HE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HE WAS NOT TOLD HE COULD BE SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, PLEA VACATED (FIRST DEPT).
EMAILS DID NOT EXPLICITLY WAIVE THE INITIAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE BOUND UNTIL A FORMAL AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED, NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THERE IS CLEARLY A NEED FOR A STATUTORY MECHANISM TO KEEP CHILDREN WHO ABSCOND FROM PLACEMENT SETTINGS OFF THE STREETS AND SAFE FROM HARM, FAMILY COURT ACT 153 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE AN ARREST WARRANT FOR THIS PURPOSE (FIRST DEPT)
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL OFF THE BACK OF A FLATBED TRUCK AS STEEL BEAMS WERE BEING HOISTED FROM THE TRUCK (FIRST DEPT).
THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY STATED FACTS AMOUNTING TO A BREACH-OF-FIDUCIARY-DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT REAL ESTATE BROKER, DESPITE PLAINTIFF-SELLER’S CONSENT TO THE BROKER’S “DUAL AGENCY;” IT WAS ALLEGED THE BROKER WAS AWARE THE PROPERTY WAS TO BE SUBDIVIDED AND SOLD BY THE BUYERS FOR THREE TIMES THE PRICE AND SHE WOULD BE THE BUYERS’ BROKER FOR THE SUBSEQUENT SALES (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ATTORNEY FOR THE SEVERELY DISABLED CHILD COULD CONTINUE TO MAKE FOSTER CARE... Negligence of Dog Owners In Calling A Dog Which Ran Into Bicyclist’s Path...